Differentiating agency independence: perceptions from inside the European Medicines Agency (EMA) by Makhashvili, Levan & Stephenson, Paul
 Citation 
 
Makhashvili, L. and Stephenson, P. (2013). ‘Differentiating Agency Independence: Perceptions from 
Inside the European Medicines Agency’, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 9 (1), pp. 4‐23. 
 
First published at: www.jcer.net 
Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 
 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013)  
 
  
  
Differentiating Agency Independence: 
Perceptions from Inside the European Medicines 
Agency 
Levan Makhashvili  Tbilisi State University 
Paul Stephenson  Maastricht University 
 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net  Levan Makhashvili and Paul Stephenson 
 5 
Abstract 
The regulations granting the establishment of EU agencies were meant to ensure institutional independence in 
order to insulate everyday decision-making from political pressure, vested interests and political short-termism. 
However, recent events, including managerial resignations and the introduction of new rules concerning 
conflicts of interest, have brought renewed attention to the autonomy/independence debate. This article goes 
beyond the traditional de jure/de facto dichotomy of approaches to approaching the question of independence to 
consider perceptions of agency staff. It seeks to gauge the opinions of members of the European Medicine 
Agency’s Management Board with regard to agency autonomy, distinguishing between four types of 
independence: legal, financial, administrative, decision-making. It draws on data collected using questionnaires, 
and interpreted using the expert evaluation method, to rank the importance given to types of independence 
among sub-sets of stakeholders overseeing the EMA. 
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Recent events have highlighted the sensitive issue of agency independence and 
questioned the checks and balances in place to ensure that agencies operate 
autonomously from business and political interests. In June 2010, the European 
Ombudsman ordered the European Medicines Agency (EMA) – the body meant to ensure 
that all medicines in Europe are safe and effective for citizens – to ‘cough up the 
information’, accusing it of maladministration; only in February 2011 did the EMA 
‘acquiesce’ to the demand (EUobserver.com 2011). In December 2010, the agency’s 
executive director resigned to go and work for a private consultancy advising the 
pharmaceutical industry. This incidence of a high-profile agency staff member drifting 
between public and private sector positions – a case of ‘revolving doors’ – was given the 
green light by the agency’s Management Board (MB), which, it was reported, saw no 
conflict of interest (European Medicines Agency 2010a, 2010b). Then, in May 2011, the 
question of EU agency independence was brought under the spotlight controversially 
when the European Parliament refused – by a decision of 637-to-4 votes – to sign off the 
agency’s accounts; the agency being ‘further bludgeoned’ when the Parliament 
subsequently ordered an investigation into the EMA’s financing and the independence of 
its experts vis-à-vis the pharmaceutical industry (EUobserver.com 2011). 
Over the last decade, scholars have addressed the notion of agency autonomy, analysing 
what position agencies hold in the hierarchy of the EU’s organisational structure, i.e. 
whether they are independent or semi-independent from – or else completely dependent 
on – the EU institutions and other actors (Gardner 1996; Everson and Majone 2000; 
Kreher 2001; Shapiro 2001; Gilardi 2002; Geradin 2005; Vos 2000, 2005; Tarrant and 
Keleman 2007; Groenleer 2006, 2009; Sacchetti 2009; Busuioc 2009, 2010). More 
recently, scholars have focused on questions of agency autonomy: beginning by drawing 
on earlier studies examining the link between the institutional arrangement in which an 
agency’s operation is embedded and the scope for quasi-independent action (Gehring 
and Krapohl, 2007); and later examining how accountability arrangements help to 
reinforce autonomy (Busuoic et al. 2011) and which actors are most able to act 
autonomously, recognising a difference between autonomy in practice versus in legal 
terms (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). 
The regulations founding the EU agencies gave them a degree of independence in order 
for their everyday decision-making to be insulated from political pressure and the short-
term preferences of interested parties, to ensure that objective and politically-unbiased 
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information could be made available to decision-makers. The Commission’s own activity 
is frequently defined, or at least heavily influenced, by the information provided by the 
European agencies. As a result, the functioning of agencies attracts the attention of 
external actors and stakeholders, each with their own political or financial agenda. 
‘Objective’ information becomes significant and desirable, causing the interest and 
involvement of other actors, eager to obtain this information and influence it. Regulatory 
agencies have ‘some formal decision-making authority’ and ‘are more likely to be 
formally shielded against interference from the Commission, the member states and 
stakeholders’ Christensen and Nielsen (2010: 182). However, actual independence is 
rarely explicit in the everyday policy-making of the agencies – does it exist, or is it a 
myth? As Borrás et al. (2007: 584) assert, the daily operation of agencies cannot be 
decoupled from their political and social environment; their operation depends upon 
socially-constructed perceptions and legitimacy-related beliefs. 
Investigating how agencies themselves perceive independence means trying to glean the 
attitudes and opinions of those working inside. The division of roles is opaque: ‘external 
actors’ sit inside agencies on the Management Boards. What importance do ‘external’ 
actors such as supranational institutions attach to the independence of the agency? How 
do member state representatives on the Management Board perceive their role vis-à-vis 
the Commission? Which types of independence are at stake and which is deemed most 
important, by whom? In which areas of activity does agency staff believe it exerts most 
influence? How might we measure variation among individuals within the agency? 
This article aims to investigate the importance attached to various dimensions of 
autonomy, by investigating the perceptions of those managing the European Medicines 
Agency. These dimensions of autonomy comprise four types of independence: 
administrative, legal, financial and decision-making. The research seeks to enhance our 
understanding of the work of EU agencies, and their relation with the EU institutions, in 
particular, the European Commission. The second part of this article explores the notion 
of independence versus autonomy, explores agency management boards and introduces 
the European Medicines Agency. The third part considers a methodology for gauging how 
Board members rank the importance of dimensions of independence. The fourth part 
analyses the data collected to draw out variations in the importance attached by sub-
sets within the Management Board to types of agency independence, and considers what 
the findings contribute to the wider literature on EU agencies. 
 
AUTONOMY, INDEPENDENCE AND THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY 
Definitions and perspectives 
There are competing academic perspectives both on agency autonomy/independence, 
and the use of the terms. Are they synonymous or different? Agency independence has 
been said to exist when an agency can introduce its own policies, issues or solutions 
onto the agenda (Zito 2009: 1227). Yet, an agency’s independence may be only a 
‘[relative freedom] of control by any of the other organs of the [European] Community’ 
(Shapiro 2001: 289), limited by the founding regulations creating the EU agencies. 
Independence can thus be considered a situation whereby institutional behaviour is not 
‘guided by personal or national interest or political pressure’ (European Commission, 
2000: 4). Recognising the policy world as one of goal conflicts and incomplete 
information, Yesilkagit (2004: 532) points out that ‘in reality […] real autonomy may not 
correspond with the formal autonomy of agencies. Depending on the issue, agencies 
may enjoy more or less […] autonomy than formally is granted to them’. As Hanretty 
and Koop (2012: 199) recognised recently, agencies can be independent from a range of 
actors, including industry, civil society and the public, as well as from governments, 
parliaments, parties and politicians; ‘political independence’ is thus understood as day-
to-day decisions being free from the interference and preferences of politicians. The 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net  Levan Makhashvili and Paul Stephenson 
 7 
authors take this distinction further, identifying formal independence (de jure, legal), i.e. 
freedom from the ‘politics inherent in those legal instruments which constitute and 
govern the agency’, as opposed to actual independence (de facto, practical), i.e. acting 
daily without direct instructions, threats or inducements by politicians and vested 
interests. Moreover, the former is no guarantee of the latter (Hanretty 2010: 2). In 
short, one must consider not only the ability of EU agencies to act relatively 
independently from member state government institutions, but from all potential actors. 
This suggests, at least, a broad and a wide definition of independence. To be 
autonomous, therefore, an agency must be independent of political actors as well as 
stakeholders or clients (Geradin 2005: 230; Trondal & Jeppesen 2008: 421; Groenleer 
2009: 36). 
In short then, the literature can be divided into two camps. One purports that the level 
of independence is determined and fixed by the founding legislature: ‘[what] senior 
officials and staff members of EU agencies can do is often constrained, and sometimes 
wholly determined, by the formal rules and procedures put on paper’ (Groenleer 2009: 
23). This includes recent work by Wonka and Rittberger (2010), which identified 
functional and power-based factors accounting for variations in formal independence 
whereby levels of political credibility, complexity and uncertainty influence how political 
actors endow agencies with legal independence. Another camp assumes that, in reality, 
independence and power go beyond what is defined by the legal statutes but concerns 
the practicalities of the day-to-day, as agents engage with various stakeholders in 
‘providing data, information, and (mainly informal) proposals that may eventually 
influence the actual formulation of the content of the European public policy’ (Barbiero 
and Ongaro 2008: 397). This includes work by Busuioc et al. (2011), which tries to move 
beyond de jure character to de facto manifestation, by investigating practice inside the 
European Police Office, observing how low levels of actual autonomy, even if only 
through an overload of formal accountability mechanisms, can stifle agency 
development. The authors assert that ‘independent (i.e. fully autonomous) agents 
generally do not exist in systems of representative government since they are bound by 
the decisions of others (ibid. 850). For operational purposes, we perceive of autonomy 
as comprising types of independence that each set of stakeholders may rank differently 
in order of importance, as explored later in this section. 
 
The role and status of management boards 
As Keleman (2002: 102) recognised over a decade ago, any consideration of agency 
independence must recognise that the Commission itself is a ‘generalist independent 
agency’ created by the member states and by extension then, one must ask, ‘of what 
exactly were these agencies intended to be independent’. Moreover, agency design – 
‘including the scope of their powers and their management structures’ (Keleman 2002: 
94) - was not solely determined by efficiency concerns; inter-institutional politics also 
played a role. Seeking to exert control over agency functions, member states designed 
agencies with management structures and operating procedures that would ensure 
oversight and control. Management Boards, comprised of nationally-appointed 
representatives alongside Commission, European Parliament and industry 
representatives, select the director and scientific committee. The EMA’s own Board was 
originally made up of two representatives per member state, as well as two per EU 
institutions; with decision by two-thirds majority it was easy for the supranational bodies 
to be outvoted. Hence, it is questionable whether, with such strong intergovernmental 
management, there was any transfer in regulatory responsibility (Keleman 2002: 101). 
Acknowledging the limits of parliamentary oversight and representation, MEPs criticised 
the member state domination of MBs, on the grounds of transparency and democratic 
accountability (ibid. 2002: 104). In the creation of later agencies, the EP secured a 
greater role, such as with the European Food Safety Agency, created in the wake of the 
Mad Cow crisis (ibid. 2002: 108-110). 
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To what degree is the Management Board part of the agency? Is it the pivotal element 
linking external stakeholders with the agency staff (experts) as Busuioc (2009, 2010) 
and Groenleer (2006, 2009) assert, or is it a ‘puppet’, pulled by external strings? 
Certainly individual Board members have other institutional affiliations – i.e. identities 
and interests – and cannot thus be seen purely to represent the singular interests of the 
agency; as such there is potential for conflicts of interest. Yet, this raises the issue of 
loyalty and trust that is implicit in the collective membership of groups, the forging of 
common institutional (agency and board) identity and adherence to formalised codes of 
conduct (European Commission 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008). There has certainly been 
controversy over agency departures to industry, particularly for high-profile figures with 
experience, insight and networks, yet one should guard against presumptions of 
management boards as manipulated by third parties. That said, the EMA has recently 
revised its policy on the handling of conflicts of interest for scientific committee 
members, experts and agency staff, aimed at achieving ‘a more robust system’. Its 
Management Board, at its meeting of 13 December 2012, agreed ‘to develop initiatives 
for greater transparency and communication with stakeholders’ and endorsed ‘the 
continuing implementation of the conflicts of interest policies and their monitoring’ 
(European Medicines Agency 2012). 
 
The European Medicines Agency 
The EMA is most similar to the regulatory model (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 95) and 
‘comes closest to being a fully-fledged regulatory body’ (Majone 2001a: 263). As 
Gehring and Krapohl (2007: 209) assert, the EMA could be considered ‘among the most 
important supranational regulatory authorities’ and was ‘a blueprint for future agencies’. 
The issue of authorising medicinal products is highly sensitive, heavily disputed, worth 
billions of Euros, and impacts upon individuals, often directly and immediately. 
Moreover, health and safety regulation is one of the ‘arenas in which scientific and 
technological information battles are central to political outcomes’ (Vos 2000: 1130). The 
issue area is a ‘politically sensitive and emotionally-laden [issue] … which not only 
[involves] enormous economic interests but also [concerns] the public health of millions 
of EU citizens’ (Groenleer 2009: 141). In addition, the pharmaceuticals industry is a 
highly developed, organised and ‘intensely regulated’ field (Feick 2002: 5), hence the 
frequent and intense interactions between the EMA and its stakeholders. Its information 
is essential and potentially influential for all stakeholders (Vos 2000: 1132). 
The EMA (formerly European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products) was 
established by regulation in 1993 (Council 1993; EP and Council 1994). Based in London, 
its size has grown rapidly; in July 2011 the agency signed a 25-year lease to rent half of 
a new 20-storey tower in Canary Wharf. It now employs over 720 staff members of 
whom around 300 are scientific staff, alongside administrative staff and an increasing 
amount of IT support to manage European databases. Initially, the EMA was functionally 
and institutionally separate from the Unit for Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics of the 
Directorate General (DG) III (Industry). It then came under the responsibility of DG 
Enterprise but since March 2010 answers to DG SANCO (Health and Consumers). The 
agency has responsibility to ‘[protect] and [promote] public and animal health, through 
the evaluation and supervision of medicines for human and veterinary use’ (European 
Medicines Agency 2010) and ‘was designed to accelerate the slow, fragmented and 
costly process of assessment and authorization of pharmaceutical products and thus to 
facilitate the completion of the internal market in pharmaceuticals’ (Tarrant and Keleman 
2007: 32). The agency serves the role of a ‘hub of networks of national administrative 
agencies, research centres, testing laboratories and other expert bodies’ (Keleman 2002: 
103) and ‘coordinates national activities with respect to post-marketing surveillance […] 
inspection and laboratory controls’ (Majone 2001a: 271). 
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Importantly, for any discussion of independence, the EMA does not adopt binding 
decisions but instead prepares recommendations based on the scientific and technical 
expertise of its committees, which it then sends to the European Commission, which 
ultimately decides whether to license a certain pharmaceutical or not (Eberlein and 
Grande 2005: 95). Because of the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament, 
Council and European Commission are all effectively political principals of the EMA 
(Krapohl 2004: 520). As Thatcher (2011: 9) asserts, this implies a complex process 
involving the Commission, member state representatives and the Council, though ‘in 
practice things may well differ’. The agency’s Management Board functions as a ‘steering 
body’ in charge of overseeing the budget, appointing the executive director and 
monitoring performance (Vos 2000: 1126). It is composed of 35 members with a voting 
right – one representative from each EU member state, two each from the Commission, 
European Parliament and patients’ organisations, and one from veterinarians’ and 
doctors’ organisations. Moreover, delegates from Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway sit 
in as observers. The Commission, member states and observers usually have alternate 
representatives as well (European Medicines Agency 2009a, 2009b). 
Busuioc (2010: 146) has identified a conflict of interest in the EMA’s Management Board, 
particularly when it comes to payments made to national medicines agencies for work 
carried out on its behalf, asking whether the systems used are worthy of sound financial 
management. She reveals how the former executive director lamented the often ‘tricky 
political balance’ and delicate nature of securing agreements among Board members. 
Suffering from ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ (MAD), a term put forward by Koppell 
(2005), the MB was seen to choose to protect the interests of national offices, rather 
than ‘protecting the efficiency and financial health of the agency which it steers’ (Busuioc 
2010: 146.). 
 
Types of independence 
Legal 
The EMA does not have a Treaty base because it was founded by secondary legislation 
(European Parliament and Council 2004; Krapohl 2004: 520). Hence, as Geradin (2005: 
231) claims, ‘the EU legislative institutions can … [potentially] limit the attributions of 
[the EMA] and could even decide to dismantle [it]’. The Council of Ministers established 
the EMA by regulation but today both the Council and EP have the right to amend the 
founding legislation. In functional terms, delegating power without guaranteeing a 
degree of independence is ineffective due to the high risk of an agent failing to provide 
long-term credible commitments, hence Majone’s (2001b: 109-110) argument that it is 
in the best interests of the principals to provide at least minimal support for 
independence. On this basis, one might claim that, although the EMA’s legal status can, 
in principle at least, be modified, it would be costly to do so. As Groenleer (2009: 32) 
asserts, once an organisation’s founders have endowed it with legal personality, it is 
difficult to alter’. 
The EP has many mechanisms to control the EMA, including monitoring its website, 
compulsory regular reporting by the executive director in the specialised parliamentary 
committee, through the feedback of its representative in the administrative board, as 
well as EP committee delegation visits to the agency every two years (Corbett et al. 
2007). It can give ‘negative advice’ on the appointment of its executive director 
(Andoura and Timmerman 2008: 14-16). Moreover, the EP has previously ‘supported 
inquiries by the European Ombudsman into administrative procedures and urged it adopt 
and publicize administrative codes of conduct’ (Keleman 2002: 110). Recently, the EMA 
took up the European Ombudsman’s recommendation, agreeing to further broaden 
access to documents held by the agency (European Medicines Agency 2010). In addition, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) monitors the actions and decisions of the EMA and, 
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at the request of EU institutions or citizens, can further scrutinise its functioning 
(Keleman 2002: 99). This procedure is especially important because the applicants (e.g. 
citizens) may be directly affected by any newly-authorised pharmaceutical product – 
hence, the possibility to take a case to the ECJ against the EMA’s ‘decisions’. 
 
Financial 
Due to the fact that the agency’s EU financing is made up of non-compulsory 
expenditure, the EP has the power to grant (or not) the discharge of EU funds: it refused 
to do so in May 2011. Under the procedure, the executive director of the EMA is ‘heard 
by the European Parliament (Budget Control Committee) on the budgetary exercise in 
question’ (Sacchetti 2009: 17). The EP can also ask for reports and attendance at 
parliamentary committees, to overcome accountability concerns (Barbieri and Ongaro 
2008: 411-412). Unlike many other agencies, the EMA’s budget is not totally reliant on 
the Community funds; around 70 per cent is revenues generated from fees charged to 
pharmaceutical companies (Groenleer 2009: 157; Barbieri and Ongaro 2008: 416; 
Permanand and Vos 2008: 31). Such budgetary distribution is supposed to increase 
agency independence vis-à-vis the EU institutions, though this also raises questions 
about the dependence upon private firms, and the transactional nature of the 
relationship. When taking into account internal financial rules, the mechanisms 
regulating the fixing of fees and the influence of political actors over them, claims of 
agency budgetary independence are less convincing. The adoption and control of the 
EMA’s internal financial rules are highly controlled by the Management Board and the 
Court of Auditors, as Kreher (2001: 236) observes; their control is the duty of a financial 
controller appointed by the MB or its budgetary committee. 
 
Administrative 
The EP’s power to appoint the EMA’s director is limited. Although the EP can refuse a 
candidate for the post of executive director, the agency’s Management Board can 
override their advice and appoint the candidate, usually selected on the basis of 
professionalism. Thus the EP is denied the opportunity to refuse the candidate for 
political reasons alone (Andoura and Timmerman 2008). By contrast, the EP has been 
influential in introducing ‘formalized, open, transparent administrative procedures that 
create opportunity for its interest group allies to engage in indirect, ‘fire-alarm’ oversight 
and control’ (Keleman 2002: 104-105). The director is selected by the MB from the 
nominees’ list introduced by the European Commission (European Medicines Agency 
2009a). Usually one representative, appointed by the MB, participates in the selection 
process of potential candidates, alongside the European Commission. Given that any 
final recommendation is based on scientific and technical evidence, the credibility and 
independence of experts producing this evidence needs to be ensured. In the case of the 
EMA, the agency itself nominates the experts but it is a mandatory procedure to consult 
the MB, without whose approval their choice is not legal. 
 
Decision-making 
The ultimate right of decision is another mechanism to control the agency’s decision-
making capacity in cases of conflict of interest. If the European Commission, with the 
consultation of the standing committees, cannot make a decision on a specific issue then 
it is referred to the Council, enabling this institution to further restrict the decision-
making autonomy of the EMA. In addition to their ability to control the agency through 
the Council, the member states are strongly represented on its Management Board. The 
MB generally monopolises decision-making and ultimately controls many aspects of the 
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agency’s functioning. As a result, the member states are arguably the actors most 
influential on the EMA itself in terms of determining its degree of independence. 
The Commission’s influence on agency decision-making and finances is apparent, given 
that it has the final say on the policies of the agency. If the Commission overturns an 
agency recommendation, it must ‘justify the deviation, and provide a good argument for 
the decision’ (Krapohl 2004: 532). Busuioc (2009: 612) highlights the informal power of 
the Commission in influencing decision-making, which originates in its role as financial 
provider. However, since the EMA is partially self-financed and partially-dependent on EU 
funds, the Commission’s influence on the agency’s financial and decision-making 
independence is expected to be neither high nor low. Groenleer (2009: 166) emphasises 
various methods that the competent national bodies employ to force their interests upon 
the agency. The first, and arguably most important, is a system of pharmaceutical self-
assessment – national authorities can broker their preferences through a network of 
Heads of the Medicines Agencies (HMA), which currently presents ‘a mechanism for 
communicating the views of [the] member states’ competent authorities with the 
Commission and the EMEA’ (ibid. 166). 
All decisions are ultimately adopted by the European Commission, but the EMA 
‘nonetheless plays a highly autonomous role in industrial and social regulation’ (Everson 
and Majone 2000: 65). The reasons for this are two-fold: firstly, although the decision-
making of the agency is controlled, in Majone’s (2001a) words, ‘with information, 
knowledge and persuasion as the principal means of influence’, the EMA uses the 
opportunity to assert influence and (to some degree) play an independent role in the 
process; secondly, it is in the interests of the EMA’s committees to be as objective as 
possible, in order to maintain trust and credibility with decision-makers at higher levels. 
The importance placed on independence has grown significantly over time (Everson and 
Majone 2000: 59), but the accounts scandal of May 2011 has damaged political trust and 
external perceptions of objectivity. 
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Theory 
Theorists of sociological institutionalism (SI) believe that an institution is not purely a 
rational tool in the hands of its creators emphasising the role of argumentation and 
persuasion in a process of negotiation between and inside institutions. They argue that 
this process of ‘interaction and the exchange of views can lead to the creation of new 
identities, attitudes, or roles’ (Lewis 2003: 107-108). Borrás et al. (2007: 584) assert 
that ‘socially-constructed perceptions and legitimacy beliefs, institutional path 
dependency and actor-related arguments (constellations, resources, knowledge)’ are 
crucial to the setting up, but thereafter, also the running of agencies. We can discern 
from this that perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy inside the agency are shaped 
by, and contingent upon, the social and political environment both within the various 
internal agency fora used for decision-making and control, and externally. Eventually, a 
‘[thick] institutional environment’ (Lewis 2003: 106) might (re)shape the belief systems 
of the actors involved in its functioning. Thus, investigating how actors inside the agency 
perceive themselves (to be and to behave) is necessary, in order to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of independence. Groenleer (2009: 42) claims that ‘the process 
of institutionalization differentiates the organization from its environment, makes it 
robust in the face of changing (and adverse) conditions, and gives it an autonomous 
status beyond the assigned legal mandates and formal tasks’. In short, agencies may 
develop a distinctive set of values and a strong organisational culture, evolving from 
‘rational tools into social institutions’ (ibid.). Recognising this has obvious implications for 
research methods and design, hence the use of questionnaires and interviews in this 
article to investigate attitudes towards autonomy. 
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Research design and methodology 
In order to rank the importance given to types of independence inside the EMA, and to 
see how this relates to the role played by different sets of political and non-political 
stakeholders on the Management Board, our research goes beyond the formal language 
and official rhetoric of the documents. It seeks to gauge the opinions and experiences of 
Board members to try to ascertain where they may be similarities and differences in 
attitudes towards agency (and Board) independence. Given their scope for oversight, 
Board members can provide valuable and comprehensive information about the agency’s 
influence on decision-making processes and, to a limited degree, about the influence of 
external stakeholders present on the Board on agency activity, including priorities, work 
plans and regulatory recommendations. However, their views may be more general and 
less specialised than committee members. Admittedly, however, other agency staff may 
have very different and varying degrees of concern over issues of autonomy, one might 
assume technical experts to be less concerned or more distant from political dilemmas of 
independence (see Wonka and Rittberger’s (2011) examination of agency staff attitudes 
towards EU integration, policy issues and their role in policy-making). 
Questionnaires (see appendix) were circulated and then interviews conducted to gauge 
the opinions of agency stakeholders distinguishing between four different MB groups: 1) 
EU member states; 2) alternate members; 3) doctors’, patients’ and veterinarians’ 
organisations; and 4) the EP and European Commission. In order to identify the most 
important aspects of the independence from the data obtained, the Expert Evaluation 
Method was used; thereafter, answers given by the members of the EMA’s Management 
Board were calculated using the formula given below. 
 
Questionnaire design 
Participants were asked to respond to a series of statements (technically-speaking not 
questions but rather affirmative statements), some of which had to be ranked in order of 
importance. Results were aggregated to generate quantitative data. The questionnaire 
also gleaned qualitative data since participants could provide further comments in an 
open-ended section, which significantly increased the quality of information obtained 
(Goldstein, 2002). The questionnaire was divided into four blocks. Part A (question 1) 
investigated which type of independence was perceived to be most or least significant. 
The various members of the MB were asked to rank legal, financial, administrative and 
decision-making independence from 1 (most important) to 4 (least important). Part B 
(questions 2-13) studied administrative independence. Part C (questions 14-15) 
examined the role of national and common European interests in the decision-making 
process of the Board. Part D (questions 16-20) explored the financial independence of 
the EMA. Respondents were required to mark only one answer from five options. The 
scaling of answers was close to the standard ‘five-level Likert item’. 
The analysis of the questionnaire was divided into two parts. Firstly, the importance of 
different aspects of EMA independence (question Q1) was examined using the Expert 
Evaluation Method. Secondly, the degree of influence of various interested parties on 
various aspects of agency activity was calculated (questions 2-20). The questionnaire 
was sent to the members of the Management Board of the EMA (i.e. ‘insiders’), including 
to alternate members and observers. Due to missing candidates or contacts, a total 
number of 30 questionnaires were sent out. The same indicator was 25 for the alternate 
members, observers and alternate observers together. The maximum number of 
respondents depended on the size of the MB; in this case, 35 permanent members. To 
maximise the response rate and glean as much information as possible, we added 
alternate members and observers. 
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The Expert Evaluation Method (EEM) 
The main goal of the EEM is to assess the positions, opinions and attitudes of people. 
They may include academics, key decision-makers, heads of political as well as civic 
organisations, executives, parliamentarians, etc. (Matviyenko 2000). The method uses 
the so called ‘coefficient of concordance (W)’ (I-Kuei Lin 1989: 2000), which is calculated 
by a simple mathematical model known as Kendall’s formula (Kendall and Gibbons 1990; 
Legendre 2005; Siegel and Castellan 1988: 266; Zhilyakova and Larin 2009), as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The final result of the EEM is reflected in the coefficient of 
concordance, with a mathematical number that ranges from 0 to 1. Complete agreement 
among experts is expressed as 1, while total disagreement equates to 0. The W has 
been applied to the first question of the survey to ascertain the opinion of the whole of 
the EMA’s Management Board, as well as sub-sets within it. 
 
Figure 1: The coefficient of concordance. 
 
W =  
where W = the coefficient of concordance 
n = number of experts 
m = number of factors 
S = sum of squared deviations (differences) 
 
S =  
where S = sum of squared deviations 
 = simple sum of points, calculated by means of summation of all responses by EMA Board members, each 
aspect of independence treated separately 
 
 
CASE ANALYSIS: RANKING DIMENSIONS OF AUTONOMY IN THE EUROPEAN 
MEDICINES AGENCY 
Perceptions of independence types 
The response rate for the two groups was 53.3 per cent (16 replies) and 16 per cent (4 
replies), respectively. For reasons of confidentiality they are identified as E1 through to 
E20. Analysis of the questionnaires clearly shows that decision-making independence is 
perceived to be the most important aspect, followed by the financial dimension. The 
rationale is simple – these aspects have immediate and direct effect on the EMA. A 
coefficient of concordance (W) of 0.46 indicates that, although there is no complete 
consensus among the members of the MB, there is enough consent on certain issues to 
consider the results reliable, as given in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Ranking the importance of different independence types. 
Factors of 
independence 
(n = 4) 
Total score 
across E20 
respondents 
(n = 20) 
Deviation 
from 
Mean 
Square 
Deviation 
Weight (W) 
= % 
responses 
ranking 
importance 
Legal 41 -9.00 81.00 20.50 
Financial  55 5.00 25.00 27.50 
Administrative 32 -18.00 324.00 16.00 
Decision-making 72 22.00 484.00 36.00 
Total 200  914.00 
(Total = S) 
100 
Total scores = 80; average score per factor = 2.5; coefficient of concordance = 0.46 
 
These results are represented in graphical form in Figure 2 below. They demonstrate 
that the members of the Management Board consider decision-making independence to 
be the most important aspect of the overall EMA independence, followed by financial, 
legal and administrative independence. 
 
Figure 2: The overall perceived importance of the four independence types. 
 
 
Distinguishing between group perceptions 
It is possible to take this analysis further by distinguishing between the four groups of 
stakeholders to identify variations in the importance they place upon agency 
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independence. Each group (i.e. group A – EU member states (W=0.49), group B – the 
alternate members (W=0.53), group C – doctors’, patients’ and veterinarians’ 
organisations (W=0.38), group D – the EP and the European Commission (W=0.82)) has 
basically verified the results of the Management Board overall. In other words, financial 
and decision-making independence are perceived to be the most essential dimensions. 
At the same time, they highlight the perceived lesser importance of legal and 
administrative independence, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The importance of each independence type according to Board group. 
 Weight of each type per group 
Type of 
independence 
Group A 
EU member 
states 
Group B 
Alternate 
members 
Group C 
Doctors, 
patients, vets 
Group D 
Commission 
and EP 
Average 
Weight 
Legal 20.00 25.00 20.00 16.67 20.50 
Financial  24.00 27.50 30.00 36.67 27.50 
Administrative 18.00 12.50 16.67 13.33 16.00 
Decision-making 38.00 35.00 33.33 33.33 36.00 
See Figure 3 below for a graphical demonstration of these results. 
 
Figure 3: The importance of each independence type according to MB group: A) EU 
member states; B) alternate members; C) doctors, patients, vets; D) Commission and 
EP. Of the four groups, decision-making independence was perceived as the most 
important type by EU member states, while financial independence was most important 
for the Commission and EP. 
 
A, B, C and D correspond to Group A, Group B, Group C and Group 4 respectively. 
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Discussion of the findings 
The analysis highlights that the decision-making independence and financial 
independence of the EMA are perceived to be most important by the MB, while the legal 
and administrative dimensions are of lesser concern to its members. Groups C and D 
(Commission and EP) and Group C (doctors, patients, vets) place particular attention 
only on financial and decision-making independence, while Groups A and B (alternate 
members) also focus on legal independence at some point. All groups give less 
significance to the administrative aspect of the EMA’s independence.  
 
Legal independence 
The results show the lesser perceived importance of legal independence. Hence, it is 
supposed that stakeholders are less interested in seeking to influence agency-related 
legislation. As previously explained, it is not in the interests of the EU institutions to curb 
agency independence too severely. The EP is interested mostly ‘in the founding 
regulation of the agency and tries to influence it as much as it can in order to ensure 
that the tasks and the autonomy of the agency are described in the most acceptable way 
to the EP’ (interviewee 2 23.05.2010). Indeed, during the ‘founding phase’, the EP had 
strong power over the legal independence of the agency ‘by influencing its institutional 
arrangement in the founding act, yet there is relatively little interest in the day-to-day 
work of the agency’ (ibid.). Moreover, enjoying a widely recognised legal personality, the 
EMA perceives itself to be a de facto independent legal actor vis-à-vis third parties. Like 
other EU institutions with a legal personality, it is accountable to the EU Courts. In this 
sense, actors on the EMA Management Board believe the agency’s legal independence to 
be ‘safe’, despite considerable stakeholder influence. 
 
Financial independence 
As the analysis of the questionnaire results shows, financial independence is felt to be 
one of the most essential types for the EMA, hence the high number of stakeholders 
interested in agency finances. In particular, the findings emphasise a strong role for the 
European Commission in the financial management of the Board due to its role as 
budgetary provider to the EMA (Q16). By contrast, although the EP has the power of 
budgetary discharge, more than half of the Board members disagree with its actual 
weight in the decision-making process (Q17) – though this is likely to have changed 
since the events of May 2011. Another significant actor is the Court of Auditors. To the 
statement: ‘The European Court of Auditors auditing of budgetary spending strengthens 
its control of the agency’ (Q18), a majority (60 per cent) of the MB members were 
positive as opposed to 25 per cent negative. Indeed, although Court of Auditors’ reports 
are usually delivered quite late, there have been cases where it has exerted considerable 
influence over the EMA (interviewee 1 22.05.2010). However, E6 felt rather sceptical 
about the Court’s role in the EMA’s finances, stating that, theoretically at least, the Court 
of Auditors is the most influential controller of the agency, ‘but in practice the only 
strong action recognized is directed towards reducing the Member States’ competent 
authorities’ proportion of the fee income that pharmaceutical companies pay to the EMA 
for the scientific assessment of their applications’; nonetheless such assessment is the 
core business of the EMA, even if it is organised by EMA staff but carried out exclusively 
by member states’ experts. Some 65 per cent of the Board members did not identify any 
other noteworthy influence on the agency’s financial independence (Q20). Nevertheless, 
some members (e.g. E17, E19) pointed at national competent authorities acting as a 
network to influence the cost scheme, such as demanding expenditure on a 
rapporteurship. Others highlight conditions such as exchange rates having a ‘limiting 
effect’ on financial independence (E1, E11). 
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Special attention should be paid to the issue of fees paid to the agency by third parties. 
To the statement: ‘A significant part of the agency’s budget is generated through fees 
paid by third parties in the medicines sector, which, as a result, increases the EMA’s 
independence and freedom of manoeuvre’, 65 per cent of the MB members responded 
positively. However, one of the Board members (E6) disagreed, suggesting that: 
if the [fee income] is increased, the surplus should be used to reduce the public 
(EU) contribution to the budget. ‘Freedom of manoeuvre’ will be used for hiring 
additional staff. Administrative staff will always find some activity to perform, but 
the question to be (externally) checked is to what extent additional staff is really 
necessary for the fulfillment of the institution’s legal tasks. Financial pressure on 
public budgets in Europe is high, and in general this results in a cutback of public 
staff without reducing tasks. European Agencies such as EMA have largely been 
spared from that development, but should not expect this will be possible in the 
long term. 
 
Administrative independence 
The questionnaires show that the European Commission (65 per cent positive) and the 
MB (90 per cent positive) can significantly influence the appointment of the executive 
director (Q2 and Q4). By contrast, 55 per cent of the Board members consider that the 
EP does not exert the same amount of power (Q6) . Interestingly, more members feel 
positive (45 per cent) than negative (40 per cent) about the ability of the 
representatives from the doctors’, patients’ and veterinarians’ organisations to influence 
the appointment (Q8). The results highlight the relative influence of the MB (55 per cent 
positive) on the everyday work of the agency (Q5). According to the same data, other 
actors were felt to be less influential: while 50 per cent believe the European 
Commission exerts an influence, only 35 per cent felt the EP did (Q3 and Q7). The 
results also indicate the perception that stakeholders such as the representatives from 
other countries (E8), industry, academia (E10), physicians (E11) and national consumer 
agencies (E13) can at some point influence the appointment and everyday work of the 
executive director (Q12 and Q13). For example, E10 commented that, ‘through its [i.e. 
the EMA’s] wide range of consultations, industry or academia, by participating in setting 
the agenda of the agency, they can thereby influence the everyday work of the executive 
director’. 
 
Decision-making independence 
The results emphasise the great importance and the powerful role of the Management 
Board and European Commission in the decision-making process. However, as the Board 
members underline, national and common European interests are usually balanced (Q14 
and Q15), thus minimising the possibility of subjectivity among decision-makers. 
Contrary to the majority of questionnaire answers, interviewee 1 argued that in the case 
of the Commission, the agency is ‘firmly consolidated by practice’, well operated and 
powerful enough to do whatever it wants and not to agree with the Commission, 
implying that the Commission cannot actually influence it very much. 
Other than the Board, another way in which the EU member states might influence the 
EMA is via the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), most members 
of which are not independent scientists, but representatives of the competent national 
authorities. Often members are risk managers in the national agencies deciding on the 
authorisation of new medicines. In this regard, the member states, and national 
competent authorities in particular, play a strong role in the decision-making process 
(interviewee 1). 
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The role of the EP in the decision-making is marginal due to its limited involvement in 
the Board. For example, interviewee 1 presented one example of the EP representative, 
an Italian professor, who had not given any feedback to the EP: ‘he was sitting more or 
less on his own capacity and not really providing any personal feedback’. Recently, this 
has been changing. Closer links with the EP have been established, including an 
organised feedback system. Furthermore, certain people are assigned to monitor 
particular agencies (nowadays a Dutch MEP for the EMA); in short, these and other 
instruments provide the EP with the sources of information needed if it is to be able to 
understand properly and control the agency. Interviewee 1 observed that essentially it 
possesses information rather than influence, however, as interviewee 2 argued, ‘if the EP 
wants to turn this information into influence, it can do so’. 
Finally, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance also play a role in controlling 
the EMA’s functioning. Despite no legal basis for judicial review, they have always 
performed such a task (e.g. Court of First Instance – Case T-133/03) (interviewee 1). 
Although Article 263 of the Lisbon Treaty gives a constitutional right to the Courts to 
review the agencies, in cases where the latters’ decisions are binding for third parties, 
their role in shaping the agency remains limited. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Finding a practical method for measuring perceptions is no easy task. This article used 
questionnaires in order to capture systematically Board members’ opinions. It has 
demonstrated how agency autonomy might be analysed by conceiving of dimensions of 
autonomy, and thereafter, differentiating independence. Four types of independence 
were identified, in order to examine the beliefs of various actors within the management 
board, which cannot be treated as a single unit, since it comprises various sub-sets of 
political and non-political stakeholders, each with its own agendas, loyalties and vested 
interests. The method enabled results to be isolated for individual sub-sets of MB actors. 
Using questionnaires was useful but it was essential to complement this with interviews 
where possible. Face-to-face interviews with MB members are becoming more difficult as 
agencies increasingly employ Communications Officers to provide a single voice on 
agency issues. In short, sociological institutionalism’s focus on perceptions, attitudes and 
role behaviour is useful when seeking to understand how independence is actually 
articulated, or played out – not on the premise of the founding legislation, but through a 
process of internalising and institutionalising norms and rules, as well as social learning, 
both inside the EMA in the almost 20 years since the agency was created in its original 
guise, and between the agency and its stakeholders. 
This article found that the EMA possesses a higher perceived degree of independence in 
some areas than others. Differentiated dimensions of autonomy are acknowledged by 
members of the Management Board. On the basis of the results, members do not 
consider the agency to be either fully independent or fully dependent. Consequently, the 
EMA can be considered a semi-autonomous and/or semi-controlled agency. What are the 
implications of distinguishing different forms of agency independence, to find that 
decision-making independence is regarded as the most important? This finding is in 
some senses paradoxical since the MB is not directly concerned with regulatory 
questions, and does not regulate. Instead, it is the agency secretariat and various issue-
specific committees which make recommendations, with the Commission taking final and 
binding decisions. Yet, the MB does make decisions in regarding the direction and 
internal functioning of the agency, an area where the Commission and other external 
actors would arguably not seek to exert as much direct control. The analysis showed up 
the contrasting perceptions of those in the MB of its strength vis-à-vis the Commission, 
even if managerial power was (unsurprisingly) an important factor for all respondents 
exerting it, collectively. 
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The findings presented in this paper are supported by recent research, particularly on 
the power of the Commission vis-à-vis EU agencies and the ‘intimate’ relationships that 
seem to develop between EU agencies and relevant DGs in the Commission – here, DG 
Enterprise, then DG Sanco. Thus, EU agencies seem to strengthen and legitimise 
(though member state engagement) the executive capacity of the Commission. Since 
the Lisbon Treaty introduced new changes to the roles of other agency stakeholders not 
identified in this research, it would be fruitful to examine whether they impose 
challenges to EU agencies by introducing more control mechanisms, thus potentially 
limiting their independence, or if the modifications provide opportunities for agencies to 
play a greater – and more independent – role in EU policy-making. Concerning financial 
and decision-making independence at least, the European Parliament looks set to play a 
stronger role in scrutinising how the EMA generates its revenues and recruits its 
‘independent’ experts. 
 
*** 
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APPENDIX 
No. Question / Statement 
1 In your opinion, which aspect of independence is most important? 
2 The European Commission can influence the appointment of the executive 
director of the EMA by suggesting a candidate. 
3 The European Commission can influence the everyday work of the executive 
director of the EMA. 
4 Members of the management board of the EMA can influence the appointment 
of the executive director of the agency. 
5 Members of the management board of the EMA can influence the everyday 
work of the executive director. 
6 The European Parliament can influence the appointment of the executive 
director of the EMA. 
7 The European Parliament can influence the everyday work of the executive 
director of the EMA. 
8 Representatives of patients’, doctors’ and veterinarians’ organisations can 
influence the appointment of the executive director of the EMA. 
9 Representatives of patients’, doctors’ and veterinarians’ organisations can 
influence the everyday work of the executive director of the EMA. 
10 Other stakeholders can influence the appointment of the executive director of 
the EMA. 
11 If you answer ‘a’ [strongly agree] or ‘b’ [agree] in question 10, please specify 
those stakeholders. 
12 Other stakeholders can influence the everyday work of the executive director of 
the EMA. 
13 If you answer ‘a’ [strongly agree] or ‘b’ [agree] to question 12, please specify 
those stakeholders. 
14 National interests can influence your position during negotiations in the 
management board of the EMA. 
15 Common European interests can influence your position during negotiations in 
the management board of the EMA. 
16 The European Commission’s role as a budgetary provider to the EMA in turn 
strengthens its position during the decision-making in the management board. 
17 The European Parliament’s power of budgetary discharge in turn strengthens 
its position during the decision-making in the management board. 
18 The European Court of Auditors auditing of budgetary spending strengthens its 
control of the agency. 
19 A significant part of the agency’s budget is generated through fees paid by 
third parties in the medicines sector, which, as a result, increases the EMA’s 
independence and freedom of manoeuvre. 
20 As far as you know, is there any other actor that has an influence on the 
finances of the EMA? 
 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net  Levan Makhashvili and Paul Stephenson 
 21 
REFERENCES 
Andoura S and Timmerman P (2008). ‘Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European Agencies 
Reignited’. Working Paper of European Policy Institute Network 19 (October). 
Barbieri D and Ongaro E (2008). ‘EU agencies: what is common and what is distinctive compared with 
national-level public agencies’. International Review of Administrative Sciences 74 (3): pp. 395-420. 
Borrás S, Koutalakis C and Wendler F (2007). ‘European agencies and input legitimacy: EFSA, EMeA and 
EPO in the post-delegation phase’. Journal of European Integration 29 (5): pp. 583-600. 
Busuioc M (2010). The Accountability of European Agencies – Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices. 
Utrecht: Eburon. 
Busuioc M (2009). ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies’. 
European Law Journal 15 (5): pp. 599-615. 
Busuioc M, Curtin, D and Groenleer M (2011). ‘Agency growth between autonomy and accountability: 
the European Police Office as a “living institution”’. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (6): pp. 848-
867. 
Christensen J G and Nielsen V L (2010). ‘Administrative capacity, structural choice and the creation of 
EU agencies’. Journal of European Public Policy 17 (2): pp. 176-204. 
Corbett R, Jacobs F and Shackleton M (2007). The European Parliament. London: John Harper. 
Council of the European Union (1993) .Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. CELEX 
number: 31993R2309. 
Eberlein B and Grande E (2005). ‘Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the EU 
regulatory state.’ Journal of European Public Policy 12 (1): pp. 89-112. 
Egeberg M and Trondal J (2011). ‘EU-level agencies: new executive centre formation or vehicles for 
national control?’. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (6): pp. 868-887. 
EUobserver (2011). EU drugs regulator accused of being too cozy with Big Pharma’.11.05.11 Accessed 
20 July 2011 at http://euobserver.com/news/32309. 
European Commission (2008). ‘European Agencies – The Way Forward’. Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. COM(2008) 135 final. 
European Commission (2005). Explanatory Memorandum. Draft Interstitutional Agreement on the 
Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies. COM (2005) 59 final. 
European Commission (2002). Communication from the Commission – The operating framework for the 
European Regulatory Agencies. COM (2002) 718 final. 
European Commission (2000). Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. Relations with the public. 
Entered into force 1 November 2000. Accessed 15 February 2012 at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/code/_docs/code_en.pdf 
European Medicines Agency (2012). European Medicines Agency’s Management Board endorses work 
programme 2013. Press release 18 December 2012. Accessed 20 January 2013 at: 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2012/12/news_detail_0
01680.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1 
European Medicines Agency (2010a). European Medicines Agency notes European Ombudsman’s 
recommendation to increase transparency. Accessed 10 May 2010 at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/home.htm. Can still be viewed at: http://www.nelm.nhs.uk/en/NeLM-
Area/News/2010---May/12/EMEA-notes-European-Ombudsmans-recommendation-to-increase-
transparency/ 
European Medicines Agency (2010b) Appointment of the Executive Director. Minutes of the 65th meeting 
of the Management Board. 18 March 2010. EMA/MB/806136/2009. London. 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net  Levan Makhashvili and Paul Stephenson 
 22 
European Medicines Agency (2009a). Rules of procedure of the Management Board. 
EMA/MB/115339/2004/en/Rev.2. 
European Medicines Agency (2009b). Guide to the European Medicines Agency. 3 May 2010/ 
EMA/765521/2009. 
European Parliament and Council (2004). Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of 31 March 2004 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency. L 136/1, 30.04.2004. 
Everson M and Majone G (2000). ‘European agencies within the Treaties of the European Union’. In: M 
Everson, G Majone, L Metcalfe and A Schout The role of specialised agencies in decentralising EU 
governance. Report presented to the European Commission. Accessed 23 January 2013 at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pdf 
Feick J (2002). ‘Regulatory Europeanization, National Autonomy and Regulatory Effectiveness: Marketing 
Authorization for Pharmaceuticals’. MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/6. Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Gardner JS (1996). ‘The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicines and European Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals’. European Law Journal 2 (1): pp. 48-82. 
Gehring T and Krapohl S (2007). ‘Supranational regulatory agencies between independence and control: 
the EMEA and the authorization of pharmaceuticals in the European Single Market’. Journal of European 
Public Policy 14 (2): pp. 208-226. 
Geradin D (2005). ‘The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the American 
Experience’. In: D Geradin, R Munoz and N Petit (eds). Regulation through Agencies in Europe: A New 
Paradigm for European Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 215-245. 
Gilardi F (2002). ‘Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative 
empirical analysis’. Journal of European Public Policy 9 (6): pp. 873-893. 
Goldstein K (2002). Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews. Political Science and 
Politics 35 (4): pp. 669-672. 
Groenleer M (2009). The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of Institutional 
Development. Delft: Eberun Academic Publisher. 
Groenleer M (2006). ‘The European Commission and Agencies’. In: D Spence (ed) The European 
Commission. London: John Harper, pp. 156-172. 
Hanretty C (2010). ‘Explaining the de facto independence of public broadcasters’. British Journal of 
Political Science 40 (1): pp. 75-89. 
Hanretty C and Koop C (2012). ‘Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies’. Journal of 
European Public Policy 19 (2): pp. 198-216. 
Keleman D (2002). ‘The Politics of ‘Eurocratic’ Structure and the New European Agencies’. West 
European Politics 25 (4): pp. 93-118. 
Kendall M G and Gibbons J D (1990). Rank Correlation Methods. Fifth edition. London: Edward Arnold. 
Koppell G S (2005). ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities 
Disorder”’. Public Administration Review 65 (1): pp. 94-108. 
Krapohl S (2004). ‘Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative 
Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuffs’. European Law Journal 10 (5): 
pp. 518-538. 
Kreher A (2001). ‘Agencies in the European Community – a step towards administrative integration in 
Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (2): pp. 225-245. 
I-Kuei Lin L (2000). ‘A Note on the Concordance Correlation Coefficient’. Biometrics 56: pp. 324–325. 
I-Kuei Lin L (1989). ‘A concordance correlation coefficient to evaluate reproducibility’. Biometrics 45 (1): 
pp. 255-268. 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net  Levan Makhashvili and Paul Stephenson 
 23 
Legendre P (2005). ‘Species Associations: The Kendall Coefficient of Concordance Revisited’. Journal of 
Agricultural, Biological and Environmental Statistics 10 (2): pp. 226–245. 
Lewis J (2003).’ Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision Making: Rationalist or 
Constructivist?’ Comparative Political Studies 36 (1-2): pp. 97-124. 
Majone G (2001a). ‘The new European agencies: regulation by information’. Journal of European Public 
Policy 4 (2): pp. 262-275. 
Majone G (2001b). ‘Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance’. 
European Union Politics 2 (1): pp. 103-121. 
Matviyenko VY (2000). Prognostics. Prognostication of social and economic processes: Theory, 
Methodology, Practice. Kiev: Ukrainian Propylons. 
Permanand G and Vos E (2008). ‘Between Health and the Market: The Roles of the European Medicines 
Agency and European Food Safety Authority’. Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2008/4. 
Sacchetti F (2009). The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Between Autonomy and 
Accountability. Lucca: Institute for Advanced Studies. 
Shapiro M (2001). ‘The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union’. 
Journal of European Public Policy 4 (2): pp.276-277. 
Siegel S and Castellan NJ (1988). Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. Second edition. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Tarrant A and Keleman R (2007). ‘Building the Eurocracy: The Politics of EU Agencies and Networks’. 
Paper prepared for the Biennial European Union Studies Association Convention. Montreal, Canada. 16-
19 May 2007. 
Thatcher M (2011). ‘The creation of EU regulatory agencies and its limits: a comparative analysis of 
European delegation’. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (6): pp.790-809. 
Trondal J and Jeppesen L (2008). ‘Images of Agency Governance in the European Union’. West European 
Politics 31 (3): pp. 417-441. 
Vos E (2005). ‘Independence, Accountability and Transparency of European Regulatory Agencies’. In: D 
Geradin, R Munoz and N Petit (eds). Regulation through Agencies in Europe: A New Paradigm for 
European Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 120-137. 
Vos E (2000). ‘Reforming the European Commission: What role to play for EU agencies?’ Common 
Market Law Review 37 (5): pp. 1113-1134. 
Wonka A and Rittberger B (2011). ‘Perspectives on EU governance: an empirical assessment of the 
political attitudes of EU agency professionals’. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (6): pp. 888-908. 
Wonka A and Rittberger B (2010). ‘Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional 
Independence of 29 EU Agencies’. West European Politics 33 (4): pp. 730-72. 
Yesilkagit K (2004.) ‘Bureaucratic Autonomy, Organizational Culture, and Habituation: Politicians and 
Independent Administrative Bodies in the Netherlands’. Administration & Society 36 (5): pp. 528-552. 
Zhilyakova EV and Larin CN (2009). ‘Methods and techniques of independent examination’. Journal of 
VSU series: Economics and Management 2: pp. 108-116 (available in Russian). 
Zito AR (2009). ‘European agencies as agents of governance and EU learning’. Journal of European 
Public Policy 16 (8): pp. 1224-1243. 
